Dragonfly is a password authenticated key exchange protocol that has been submitted to the Internet Engineering Task Force as a candidate standard for general internet use. We analyzed the security of this protocol and devised an attack that is capable of extracting both the session key and password from an honest party. This attack was then implemented and experiments were performed to determine the time-scale required to successfully complete the attack. 
Introduction
Dragonfly is a password authenticated key exchange protocol specified by Dan Harkins for exchanging session keys with mutual authentication within mesh networks [1] . Recently, Harkins submitted a variant of the protocol to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as a candidate standard for general Internet use 1 . We observe that both variants are essentially the same protocol, though some implementation details are different.
It is claimed that the Dragonfly protocol is resistant to active attacks, passive attacks, and off-line dictionary attacks [1, 2] . However, as acknowledged by the author [1] , no security proofs are given to support the claim. The lack of security proofs has raised some concerns among members on the IETF mailing list 2 . However, to our best knowledge, no one has presented concrete attacks.
In this paper, we examine the security properties of the Dragonfly protocol. Contrary to the author's claims, we show that both variants are subject to an off-line dictionary attack. In this paper, we will base our analysis upon the 1 original protocol specification as defined in a peer-reviewed paper [1] . However, the attack we will present is trivially applicable to the variant specified in [2] . (According to the Dragonfly author, the current Internet draft, which expires on April 15, 2013 [2] , will be changed soon in light of our reported attack.)
The Dragonfly Protocol
Dragonfly is based on discrete logarithm cryptography. This means that an implementation of Dragonfly can either use operations on a finite field or an elliptic curve. No assumptions are made about the underlying group, other than that the computation of discrete logarithms is sufficiently computationally difficult for the level of security required. In each case, there are two operations that can be performed: an element operation that takes an input of two elements and outputs a third element, and a scalar operation that takes an input of an element and a scalar and outputs an element.
We take the finite field as an example. Let us define p a large prime. We denote a finite cyclic group Q, which is a subgroup of Z * p of prime order q. Hence, q | p − 1. We denote the element operation A.B for elements A and B, and the scalar operation A b for element A and scalar b. These notations are in line with those commonly used when working over a finite field.
The Dragonfly protocol works as follows (also see [1] ):
• Alice, Bob have a shared password from which each can deterministically generate a password element P Q. The algorithms to map an arbitrary password to an element in Q are specified in [1] and [2] . However, the details are not relevant to our attack, so they are omitted here.
• Alice randomly chooses two scalars r A , m A from 1 to q, calculates the scalar s A = r A + m A mod q and the element E A = P −m A mod p and sends s A , E A to Bob.
• Bob randomly chooses two scalars r B , m B from 1 to q, calculates the scalar s B = r B +m B mod q and E B = P −m B mod p and sends s B , E B to Alice.
• Alice calculates the shared secret ss = (P
to Bob where H is a predefined cryptographic hash function
• Alice and Bob check that the hashes are correct and if they are then they create a shared key
This is illustrated in Figure 1 . 
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3 A Small Subgroup Attack on Dragonfly
Attack Methodology
It is claimed in [1] that the Dragonfly protocol is resistant to offline dictionary attacks. However, no security proofs are given. Instead, the author provides a heuristic security analysis as follows. It is assumed that an active attacker would select an arbitrary value for m B and compute E B = G m B where G is the group generator for Q. Then, the attacker would receive a hash value for which the only unknown input to the hash function is z where P = G z . Therefore, for an offline dictionary attack to be successful, the attacker would have to be able to compute z for a random element in Q, which contradicts the assumption that discrete logarithms are hard to compute.
We point out that computing E B = G m B is not the best option available to an active attacker. Instead, the attacker can use the following method, summarized in Figure 2 . First, the attacker computes E B = S n where S n is the generator of a small subgroup of Z * p of order n. Then, the shared secret computed by Alice is ss = (P
n , and this is the only unknown value on which the hash sent by Alice is dependent.
The attacker then uses Algorithm 1: 1) to obtain the victim's password element P ; 2) to forge a valid response B to bypass authentication (so the victim is unaware that the password has been compromised); 3) to compromise the secrecy of communication by deriving the session key K.
This attack will be feasible as S n generates a small subgroup and the password space is sufficiently small to permit dictionary attacks. In Algorithm 1 (line 5), following A = A , we will have ss = ss because the hash is assumed to be a random oracle and is collision resistant. Thus, we obtain:
where R x is a (yet unknown) small subgroup element.
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for each R x in the subgroup do 3:
A := H(ss |E A |s A |E B |s B )
5:
if A = A then 6:
Return {P, B, K} 10:
end for 12: end for After re-arranging the terms, we obtain:
Notice that the term on the left is an element in a subgroup of prime order q while the term on the right is an element in a small subgroup of order n. Since q = n, the equality holds only when both sides are identity elements in Z * p : i.e., 1. Therefore, (P s
Attack Implementation
We implemented an attack simulation in Java. The simulation consisted of three components: the password chooser that randomly chose a dictionary of password elements, the honest party who randomly chose one of these elements as a password and performed the Dragonfly protocol in an honest manner, and the dishonest party who performed the dictionary attack against the honest party.
We ran the Dragonfly protocol in a 160-bit subgroup of a 1024-bit finite group. The group parameters are specified in Appendix A. They are originally from the standard NIST cryptographic toolkit 3 . However, the NIST toolkit does not publish the small subgroups. Hence, we began by using a brute force method to determine the prime factors of p − 1 (where p is the prime modulus of the 1024 bit group). In the experiment, we only searched for prime factors of size less than 32 bits. We have found the following prime factors: 2, 3, 13, 23 and 463907. Accordingly, we calculated generators for each of the corresponding small subgroups (see Appendix B) and performed a set of experiments to determine the time to complete an offline dictionary attack for each subgroup.
Each set of experiments involved mounting the attack with dictionaries of 1000, 10000 and 100000 random password elements. The different dictionary sizes allowed us to measure how an increase in dictionary size would affect the time taken to complete the attack. In all cases, the time measured was the time to try every possible password, rather than the time until the correct password was discovered. Each experiment was performed 30 times.
Results
We note that only one possible password was identified in every experiment and this was the password chosen by the honest party. The times taken to check all possible passwords with a subgroup of size 463907 as dictionary size varies are shown in Table 1 . This illustrates that there is a fairly linear relationship between dictionary size and the time taken to try all passwords, and also that the attack is still feasible for a relatively large dictionary size. The times taken to check all possible passwords with a dictionary size of 1000 as the subgroup size varies are shown in Table 2 . In all cases the experiments were run under Windows 7 on a 2.9GHz PC with 4GB of memory. We note that some of the times measured are sufficiently large that Alice may terminate the protocol due to the large time taken for the attacker to respond. However, there are also three mitigating factors to consider: 1) We have measured the mean time to try all passwords, in practice we would expect the attacker to find the correct password without having to try all possibilities; 2) An attacker is likely to have the resources to distribute the calculations over several high performance machines, reducing the calculation time significantly; 3) Even if the protocol is terminated, the attacker will have discovered the password and may be able to make use of it in another run of the protocol.
Discussion

Preventing Small Subgroup Attacks on the Dragonfly Protocol
Small subgroup attacks can be prevented by checking that the received element E (more specifically, E A for Bob and E B for Alice) is a member of the group being used by the cryptographic scheme. This can be achieved by checking that E is member of the supergroup, that E is not the identity element and that E q is equal to the identity element. The importance of this check -known as the public key validation -in key exchange protocols has been highlighted by Menezes and Ustagolu [4] . However, to validate a public key will require a full exponentiation over the finite group, which will significantly decrease the protocol efficiency and make it less appealing than its competitors. For this reason, it remains debatable within the cryptographic community if the public key validation is indispensable. Nonetheless, at least for the case of the Dragonfly protocol, we have shown that the omission of public key validation renders the protocol completely insecure.
Comparison between Dragonfly and SPEKE
We observe that the Dragonfly protocol is very similar to SPEKE [3] with two minor changes. First, it drops the constraint in [3] that p must be a safe prime (i.e., p = 2 · q + 1). Thus, it looks much more efficient than SPEKE since it can accommodate a short exponent, say a value of 160 bits instead of 1023 bits. (Given a fixed modulus p, the cost of exponentiation is linear to the bit-length of the exponent.) However, despite being efficient, the protocol is insecure for the attack we have demonstrated. If we add the cost of public key validation, Dragonfly will have no performance advantage over SPEKE.
Second, instead of sending just one single element by each participant as in SPEKE, Dragonfly adds an extra scalar in the flow. This slight change makes the protocol more complex than the original SPEKE. However, the rationale for this change is not explained in [1] or [2] . We observe that this extra complexity not only reduces the communication efficiency as the message size gets bigger, but also degrades security. To see this, let us assume there is no public key validation in both Dragonfly and SPEKE (so we can remove the effect of the first change, and only focus on studying the effect of the second change). Without the public key validation in SPEKE, an active attacker can confine the session key to an element in a small subgroup [3] . By brute force, the attacker can obtain the session key, thus defeating authentication and confidentiality in the secure communication. However, the attacker is unable to obtain the password. By contrast, in the case of Dragonfly, an active attacker is able to additionally obtain the victim's password (see Table 3 ). This observation serves to help better understand the underlying structural design of Dragonfly.
Conclusion
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